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1. Introduction 
Although the "Great Depression" was a world-wide phenomenon it had 
different manifestations in different countries. The depth of the depres­
sion, its duration, the degree to which various sectors of the economy 
were affected by it, the transmission mechanism, the role of economic 
policy and the effect on the political system were all different from one 
country to another. The purpose of the present paper is to describe and 
analyze the causes and manifestations of the great depression in Japan, 
and while doing so dispel some of the myths related to it. It must be 
remembered that a depression is not only an economic phenomenon but 
has impor~ant sociological and psychological aspects. It causes a great 
deal of human suffering and reference to it is often loaded with emotions. 
It is fertile soil for political movements to pursue their goals and pro­
vides material for popular writers to paint exaggerated pictures. The 
great depression in Japan is usually described as a traumatic event that 
disrupted the economy, with vivid descriptions of masses of unemployed 
roaming the streets. The fact that following the depression Japan took 
the path which led to war and destruction serves to magnify the size of 
the economic catastrophy. It is, therefore, interesting to look at the 
Japanese case from an international perspective and see whether the con­
ventional view can be maintained. 
A second question has to do with the inter-relationship between the 
depression and Japan's return to the gold standard on January II', 1930. 
It has often been argued that returning to the gold standard at this point 
of time has either caused, or largely intensified, the depression in Japan. 
In order to assess this view we have to look at different aspects of the 
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gold standard system and evaluate the effect of each on economic performance. 
It is often argued that the main problem was in that Japan returned to the 
gold standard at the prewar par, while the internal implications of the 
monetary system are neglected. This view needs to be scrutinized. 
The discussion proceeds as follows: in section 2 we compare Japan 
to other countries and draw some conclusions about the special features 
of the Japanese case. Section 3 discusses the return to the gold standard 
and its various effects, and section 4 gives a summary and conclusions. 
2. The "Great Depression" in Japan 
The great depression in Japan is pictured in different, almost con­
trary ways in the Japanese literature and in references to it by 
foreign scholars. While the Japanese regard it as a catastrophy of major 
proportions, it is considered to have been fairly mild by foreign observers 
who study the American or European case. Let us look at the great depres­
sion in Japan from an international perspective and see how Japan fared 
relative to other countries. Table 1 compares the rate of growth of the 
Japanese economy with that of the U.S. and several European countries. 
(Table 1)
Japan is the only country where no absolute decline in GNP took place, 
while the accumulated reduction in GNP amounted to more than 30% in the 
U.S., more than 25% in Germany, more than 10% in France and Sweden, and 
about 5% in the U.K. The events in Japan as judged by these figures do not 
1
deserve the name of a "great" depression but of a relatively mi-Id one. 
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Since the depression is often referred to as one that started in 
and had a large effect on the industrialized countries, we compare in 
Table 2 indices of industrial production of several countries. This table,
(Table 2)
too, indicates that the effect of the depression on the industrial sector 
in Japan was relatively mild. Compared to a decline of about 54% in the 
U.S. and Germany, 28% in France and 17% in the United Kingdom, industrial 
production in Japan stood at its lowest point in 1931 at only 6% below 
2
the 1929 level. 
Much of the concern with depressions (and with the "great depression" 
in particular) had to do with the question of employment. Unfortunately, 
no overal 1 unemployment figures are available for Japan at this period. 
Japan did not have an unemployment insurance system such as England, nor 
were data collected by trade unions as in the U.S. In Japan there is a 
widespread view that the number of unemployed at the bottom of the depres­
sion amounted to three million workers. 
Sato challenged this figure which was based on employment 
statistics of the Bank of Japan. He showed that these statistics reflect 
only the situation in the modern sector of the economy, composed of large 
scale companies, which suffered more than the traditional, medium-small 
scale ones. Another source of bias was introduced by the fact that 
some of the companies who were large in 1929 became smaller in 1933 and 
were eliminated from the census. Furthermore, and most important, the 
number of three million unemployed is not compatible with the fact that 
output in the non-agricultural sector declined by only 0.5% in 1930 and 
increased by 3.7% in 1931. Taking these factors into account Sato con-
3eludes that the nurnher of unemployed was about one million. 
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Let us first look at some published figures on unemployment rates. 
As mentioned before, there was no systematic collection of unemployment 
data in Japan but there are estimates supplied by the Home Ministry.4 
These are presented in Table 3 together with data for several other coun-
(Table 3) 
tries. According to these figures the unemployment rate in Japan was 
much less than in the U.S., the U.K. or Germany, not only at the lowest 
point of the depression but _e~en compared ti the 1929 rate of unemployment 
in these countries. A similar picture is obtained by the use of Ohkawa's 
5estimates of gainfully occupied population which show that employment in 
all industries hasactually increased in 1930 by 2jS,OOO and only in 1931 
was there a reduction of 629,000 (the respective figures fur non-agriculture 
are 248,000 and 712,000). This serves to support Sato's contention that 
total open unemployment was, at its worst, not more than one million 
workers. 6 As is aleo mentioned by Sato, the relatively small reduction 
in total output precludes the existence of wide-spread disguised unem­
ployment in the economy, over and above that which was there before the 
7
depression. 
One of the main victims of the depression was world trade, the 
volume of which decreased by about one quarter from 1929 to 1932, as 
shown in the last column of Tahle 4. The decline was more pronounced 
(Table 4) 
in Europe, where trade fell by almost 40%. In Japan, however, the effect 
of the depression was very mild by comparison, only a 3% decline from 
1929 to 1930, a recovery to the 1929 level in 1931 and a staggering 23% 
8increase in 1932. From this it can be deducted that there was no 
marked unemployment in the export industries. 
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In the light of the preceding section it appears that what has to 
be explained is not so much why the depression occurred in Japan but why 
it took such a mild form, relative to other countries. One logical ex­
planation is that Japan was less industrialized than other countries. 
This explanation can, however, be dismissed because countries who engaged 
in export of agricultural goods and raw materials were hard hit by the 
depression. Moreover, in Japan itself it was the agricultural sector that 
bore the brunt of the depression. 
A second explanation, presented by Lewis;
9 is that prices in Japan 
were more flexible in their downward movement than in other countries, 
so that the effect of the depression was more on prices and less on 
quantit:l.,es. This is mainly true in respect to export prices which 
went down to the extent that en~bled Japan to sell the same quantity 
of exports. It must be emphasized, and this will be an important point 
in the following discussion, that the reduction in prices of Japanese 
goods in foreign markets was not a result of a depreciation in the value 
of the yen. In spite of the overvalued exchange rate export prices 
adjusted themselves to changing demand conditions. As far as domestic 
prices are concerned, there is evidence to show that the average price 
level in Japan indeed went down more than in other countries in 1930, 
seen in Table 5, less at the trough of the price cycle. Whilebut, as 
(Table 5) 
morethe index of wholesale prices declined by 18% in Japan in 1930, 
than in any other country, the lowest point of 69.6 was actually higher 
than in all other countries except Sweden. Thus we can conclude that, 
while prices absorbed the initial shock of the depression, their overall 
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performance was not much different than in other countries. 
A third, and probably more important factor that served to alleviate 
the consequences of the depression, was the structure of the industrial 
sector and the labor market. A large share of total output in the 
onnon-agricultural sector was produced by small firms who relied 
family members rather than hired labor.10 The demand for the products 
of these firms was quite inelastic and did not change much even under 
deflationary conditions. The labor force of large companies, mainly 
in the textile industry, was comprised of young women who, when laid 
off by the companies, went back to their homes in the rural areas. 
en­The availability of cheap imports, caused by the overvalued yen, 
abled firms to get cheap raw materials and to make profits even di;ring 
a period of declining prices. 
11 
Let us now turn to analyze the effect of the depression in the 
agricultural sector. As mentioned before, the burden of the depression 
did not fall equally on all sectors of the economy, and the agricultural 
sector was the hardest hit by it. Since the cultivation of silk cocoons 
was an important source of income for farmers, the reduction in the export 
price of raw silk, amounting to about 50%, had a considerable impact on 
farmers' income. This was accompanied by a reduction in the price of 
agricultural commodities, mainly rice, in the domestic market, resulting 
both from the reduction in demand as well as an increase in supply. The 
production of rice increased 12% between 1929 and 1930-!.2 
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However, we have to remember that the depression was not a blow which 
landed on the agricultural sector in a period of prosperity, but one 
that was superimposed on an already existing trend. Since the beginning 
of the 1920s there has been a deterioration in the performance of Japanese 
agriculture, and this sector, which played an important role in the Meiji 
period, showed signs of slowing down. Several reasons have been cited 
for this development, among them that existing agricultural technology 
reached the limit of substantial improvements, and that the policy of 
importing cheap rice from the colonies depressed prices in Japan. This 
trend was reflected in the downward movement of prices received by 
farmers: The rice price index (1934-36 = 100) went down from 140.9 
in 1924 to 96.8 in 1929, before reaching the bottom of 60.2 in 1931, 
while the index of prices received by farmers for all commodities 
declined from 138.5 to 114.3 and 69.3 respectively. Even the price of 
cocoons started its declining trend long before the depression, going 
down from 258.5 in 1925 to 170.6 and 75.5 in 1929 and 1931 respectively~3 
The second point to note is that there was a reduction not only in 
the price of farm output but also in prices paid by farmers for inputs. 
As seen from Table 6, the relative price of output to inputs declined 
by 14% in 1930 but recovered in 1932 with a higher value than in 1929. 
(Table 6)
The reduction in input prices caught up quickly with the reduction in 
output prices and left the farmers in a better position than before 
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the depression. In addition,there was a decline in prices of goods 
consumed by farmers which also served to mitigate their hardship.14 
Another factor which tended to alleviate the plight of the farmers 
was the decline in rent. The rent of paddy fields went down by 37% and 
that of upland fields 14% between 1929 and 1930. 15 It is interesting to 
look at value-added in agriculture, calculated at 1934~36 prices. From 
1929 to 1930 there was a 12.5% increase in this figure, followed by a 
17.7% decrease in 1931 but an increase of 9.8% and 18.9% in 1932 and 1933 
respectively. The total effect was an increase of 21% in agricultural 
value-added in fixed prices between 1929 and 1933, a year in which the 
figure reached an all time record. Another indication of the proposition 
that the conditions in the agricultural sector were not as bad as has 
been claimed, is in the behavior of the net capital stock series. There 
was a continuous, though small, annual increase in the real net capital 
stock, namely net investment was positive. 
All this evidence does not mean that farmers did not suffer under 
the depression. The main reason lay in the increase of the real burden 
of debt. However, the effect of the depression appears to be of a very 
short-run nature, not much different from other calamities which befell 
Japanese agriculture during the prewar period. 
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3. The Gold Standard 
The term "gold standard" is somewhat ambiguous and may include all 
or some of the following: (1) full convertibility of fiat money into gold, 
(2) permission to buy gold bullions from the central bank and ship them 
abroad, (3) a committment of the government to a fixed exchange rate with 
the value of domestic currency defined in terms of gold, and (4) a fixed 
ratio between currency in circulation and the amount of gold reserves held 
by the central bank. When Japan went off the gold standard on September 12, 
1917, it was done through an imposition of an embargo on gold exports, but 
at the same time it was also a transition from a fixed to a floating exchange 
rate regime. Nevertheless, another feature of the gold standard, namely the 
gold reserve requirements with respect to domestic currency, was left 
intact. The return to the gold standard in 1930 was done through the abo­
lition of the embargo on gold shipment, thus fixing the exchange rate in 
terms of gold, or, what amounted to the same thing (since the U.S. was on 
the gold standard) in terms of the American dollar, at the prewar rate 
of $49 3/8 per¥ 100. It was, of course, possible for Japan to return to 
the gold standard and at the same time devalue the yen. Decisions about 
return to gold (abolition of the gold embargo) and rate of exchange were, 
therefore, two independent decisions, although, in the minds of many, they 
were regarded as one and the same. There was one sense in which these 
two decisions came to fulfil the same basic goal. Rightly or 
.-wrongly, it was felt that being off the gold standard (at a time when 
virtually all indus.trialized countries returned to it) and devaluing 
the currency would undermine Japan's position in the world economy. 
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The abolition of the embargo on gold exports, implemented on 
January 11, 1930, culminated repeated efforts on the part of several 
-governments during the 20s to accomplish this act, efforts which failed 
for one reason or another. In the early 20s, when Japan still had large 
reserves of foreign exchange, accumulated during World War I, the 
embargo was not effective and its abolition could be carried out easily, 
sobut when the Kato government finally declared its intention to do the 
Kanto earthquake in 1923, followed by a large import surplus, made 
implementation impossible. An adverse balance of payments in the late 
20s made it necessary to take extensive preparatory measures before 
the gold standard could be re-installed. These measures were taken by 
the Hamaguchi cabinet, with Junnosuke Inouye, the long-time advocate of 
a return to the gold standard, as its finance minister, and on November 
21, 1929 the government declared its intention to abolish the embargo, 
which was duly carried out at the beginning of the following year. 
During this period two crucial questions bad to be answered: The 
first was a question of timing; a prerequisite for successful re-adoption 
of the gold standard was the establishment of favorable internal, as well 
as external, conditions. If Japan was not to lose a large amount of its 
gold reserves (and it was expected that some, even considerable, outflow 
would occur), domestic prices should not be rising when the step is taken; 
therefore a deflationary policy was called for. Moreover, since the 
-balance of payments is affected by the terms of trade, rather than by 
the absolute level of domestic prices, it was necessary that domestic 
adeflationary policy should not be sterilized by reduction in prices 
abroad. The second question was concerned with the exchange rate, 
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namely whether to return to gold at the old, pre-1917, par or at a 
devalued rate. Japan could observe examples of both alternatives: 
· England, who returned to the gold standard in 1925 at the prewar par, 
and France, who in 1928 chose to devaluate the franc by 80 percent 
relative to the prewar exchange rate. The advantages of a devaluation 
were that the transition be easier, no strong deflationary measures 
were needed and speculation, in favor of the yen prior to and against 
the yen after the event, would not arise. 
As mentioned above, it would be wrong to regard the return to the 
gold standard from purely a technical economic aspect.. The 
step was conceived to have educational merit, both at home and abroad. 
It was aimed at a reduction in conspicious constunption, an increase in 
saving and frugality, a move towards restructuring industry and increas­
ing efficiency and at the same time enable Japan to become a member of 
the group of respectable nations, all of whom were already on the 
gold standard at that time. Some of Japan's leaders thought that the 
great boom which had occurred during World War I caused people to lose 
qualities which were deemed necessary for a country to develop at a rapid 
pace, qualities that could be restored by a "shock treatment" of a mild 
recession. There was, however, one factor which could not be foreseen: the 
return to the gold standard coincided with the world depression which 
started in the U.S. and spread rapidly to all industrialized countries. 
There is no doubt that timing was wrong. It is, however, doubtful 
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whether a return to gold at a somewhat depreciated rate would have resulted 
in a depression of much lesser degree. Let us see why we believe that the 
~eturn to gold had a relatively small impact on the course taken by the 
economy. 
Before we address ourselves to this issue, it may be instructive to 
ask why Japan did choose to fix the value of the yen at the old par. Three 
types of considerations eocnomic, political and moral led to this decision. 
As mentioned before, the re-adoption of the gold standard was preceded by 
a period of preparations, in which a deflationary policy in Japan was aimed 
at the elimination of the import surplus and the restoration of the exchange 
rate at its prewar level. These two targets have been largely achieved: 
in 1929 Japan had a trade surplus and the yen climbed up to its desired 
rate. While the last phenomenon was, to a large extent, the result of 
speculation, it looked as if the prewar par really represented a long-run 
equilibrium of foreign exchange. There was also a more immediate reason; 
an outstanding loan amounting to 230 million yen in 4% government bonds was 
due for repayment in the London market and could be renewed, according to 
the Japanese view, only if Japan manifested the strength of its economy 
by returning to the gold standard. The political consideration was related 
to the power struggle within the Japanese Diet: a change in the rate of 
exchange could be implemented only through passage of a law. Since the 
16ruling Minseito party was only the second largest party, and in the face 
of objections by members of the Seiyukai opposition party, the amendment 
to the law would encounter strong opposition. On the other hand, a return 
to the old par took the form of an abolition of the 1917 decree (which 
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required permission for the export of gold) by the Minister of Finance, 
17and no approval by the Diet was necessary. The moral argument was that 
devaluation would be degrading for Japan and that even if a return to 
the old par were to impose hardship on the Japanese people this would 
have beneficial results in the long-run. 
With hindsight, it is clear that Japan did not choose the right 
time to return to the gold standard, but the question we have to anwer 
is whether, given the external developments, the return to gold at the old 
par did greatly aggrevate economic conditions. 
In order to do so we shall look at three issues: (1) the effect 
of the exchange rate on the balance of payments. (2) The effect of the 
gold outflow on money and prices. (3) The effect of speculation and 
anti-speculation government policy. Let us look at them in succession. 
a. The effect of the return to gold at the prewar par on Japanese trade: 
Let us assume that Japan would have devalued the yen at the time of 
her re-adoption of the gold standard. How would it affect Japanese 
exports and imports and what would be the impact on the distribution of 
income? The argument for devaluation is that it reduces the price of 
domestic goods in foreign markets and thus increases the volume of 
exports. This argument is true when export pr!ce~ are determined 
according to domestic prices. However, as we mentioned before1 pri~es 
of Japanese-made goods in foreign markets slumped without a devaluation. 
The Japanese sold their products accepting for it "what the traffic 
would bear", and doing so were able, unlike other countries, to keep 
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18the volume at almost the same level. It seems very unlikely, in these 
circumstances, that a devaluation would have substantially increased the 
volume of exports. On the other hand, the high value of the yen made it 
possible for both Japanese industry and consumers to obtain cheap imports, 
which served to counter the effect of cheaper prices of final goods and a 
reduction in money income. In this context it is interesting to note that 
France, who devalued the franc by 80% in 1928, suffered more from the 
19depression than England who returned to gold at the old par. 
Another question is concerned with the effect of gold outflow on 
the balance of payments. After the return to gold Japan experienced a 
mass outflow of gold, amounting to ¥750 million during the period 1930-32. 
This development as well as other changes in the balance of payments are 
presented in Table 7. As can be seen, both exports and imports went 
(Table 7) 
down after 1929 but the deficit in the balance of trade did not increase. 
Actually, it was substantially smaller than the average deficit during 
the period 1920-28, which amounted to ¥493 million. The outflow of gold 
was, therefore, not used to bridge the gap between imports and exports 
of goods and services, but was mainly motivated by speculation._ 
b. Monetary effects of the return to the gold standard. 
To understand the monetary effects of the gold outflow we have 
first to describe the Japanese monetary system under the gold standard. 
Until June 1932 the Act of Note Issue stipulated that the amount of notes 
could not exceed the amount of gold plus ¥120 million, against which govern­
ment securities or bonds, as well as commercial bills, were held by the Bank 
of Japan. The act was revised on July 1, 1932, and the amount of notes 
not covered by gold reserves was increased to ¥1,000 million. However, 
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even before the revision, the actual amount of notes was not, in fact, 
equal to the sum of gold reserves plus ¥120 million, but in excess of it, 
as seen in Table 8. 
(Table 8)
The effect of the outflow of gold depends on the extent to which 
the government actually follows the "rules of the game" of the gold 
standard, namely does not sterilize a reduction in gold reserves by an 
increase in the excess of issue. An inspection of Table 8 shows that 
at first the government has kept the rules: the reduction between 1929 
and 1930 in the quantity of notes, ¥206 million, is almost equal to the 
reduction in gold reserves, ¥246 million. However, the picture is very differ­
ent for the transition from 1930 to 1931, with gold reserves decreasing 
by ¥350 million but notes issued going down by only ¥106 million, with 
a substantial increase in the excess issue. The same is true for the 
period since 1932; here we must note that although Japan re-imposed the 
embargo on gold exports in December 1931 it was still on the gold stan-
dard as far as domestic note issue was concerned. 
It is quite clear from the foregoing analysis that the gold out­
flow in itself was no constraint on the ability of the Bank of Japan 
to increase the issue of Bank Notes in excess of the required reserve 
ratio. It was the unwillingness of the government to increase its 
borrowing from the Bank and to reflate the economy that affected the 
-amount of currency. When this reluctance was overcome, in 1931, the 
gold standard was no effective constraint. 
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The reduction in the note issue of the Bank of Japan had an effect on 
the total amount of currency in circulation, which also included coins, 
government notes and Yokohama Specie Bank notes. At the same time there was 
a reduction in the amount of deposits held by the public in commercial 
banks. As seen in Table 9 the reduction in deposits from 1930 to 1931 was 
(Table 9) 
twice as large as the reduction in currency and from 1930 to 1931 more 
than three times as large. 
Considering the relation between gold and the money supply, it is 
instructive to look at the American case. As shown by Friedman and 
Schwartz, there was a reduction in the stock of money during the depres­
sion despite an increase in the amount of gold reserves. In their words: 
"We did not permit the inflow of gold to expand the U.S. money stock. 
We not only sterilized it, we went much further. Our money stock moved 
20perversely, going down as the gold stock went up 11 • 
The same was true in Japan, only in the opposite direction, namely 
a reduction in the quantity of gold not matched by a corresponding reduc­
tion in the amount of notes in circulation. In 1930 the reduction in 
gold exceeded the reduction in notes by ¥40 million, in 1931 the difference 
increased to ¥258 million. It is, therefore, impossible to blame the gold 
· standard for the reduction in the stock of money, since the government 
could have sterilized its effect, and, to some extent, actually did so. 
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The effects of speculation and anti-speculation policies. 
Expectations of a return to the gold standard at the old par, reinforced 
-after the establishment of the Hamaguchi cabinet in July 1929, gave rise 
to speculative demand for yen and increased its value vis-a-vis other currencies. 
When, as the yen reached its old par value, the government decided that the 
time was ripe for lifting the embargo, speculators acted against the yen 
and demand for foeign currency increased. It must be said that the govern-
21ment expected this to happen and in order to meet the increased demand for 
foreign exchange, took several steps prior to lifting the embargo. These 
included an increase in foreign exchange reserves from ¥183 million at the 
end of June to ¥304 million at the end of December 1929, and opening credit 
lines in London and New York, to the amount of ¥100 million. 22 
These steps, however, were to no avail; speculators not only sold 
yen to profit on their previous transactions but, as time went on, 
bought foreign currency in expectation that its value will increase 
upon reimposition of the embargo. The result was a rapid dwindling of 
Japan's gold reserves. The gold reserves of the Bank of Japan went down 
from ¥1,073 million on January 10, 1930 to ¥826 million at the end of 
the year, and pltm.ged further to ¥521 million on December 5, 1931:3 
The government found itself in the position of a physician, called to 
treat a patient who suffers from two diseases, the cure for the one 
aggrevating the other. In order to stem speculators, a tight money 
24-policy was adopted and interest rates were increased.; It was, however, 
too late to curb the gold outflow. 
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The speculative effect of lifting the gold embargo and the resulting 
gold outflow may have been an important aggrevating factor but cannot be 
regarded as the major cause for the depression. Nor did the measures taken 
to counter speculation have, by themselves, a considerable effect on the 
economy: they were mostly taken at a late stage in the last three months 
of 1931, and investment decisions were probably influenced more by expecta­
tions about future demand than by changes in interest rates. 
While the psychological impact of speculation and the resulting 
gold outflow should not be undermined, their effect on the real side 
of the economy were rather limited. To a large extent they played 
the role of a warning signal that, perhaps more than anything else, 
pointed to the need for a change in policy. This change took place on 
December 13, 1931 when the new Inukai government, with Takahashi as Finance 
Minister, re-imposed the embargo on gold exports, and by the use of an 
expansionary economic policy, led Japan out of the depression. 
Sununary and Conclusions 
The three coinciding events in the early 1930s-the depression 
in Japan, the world-wide depression and the policies of the Japanese 
government raise the question of the causal relationship among them; 
in particular, whether the depression in Japan was chiefly the outcome 
of domestic factors or of imported ones. We attempted to show that 
the extent and duration of the depression in Japan were considerably 
milder than in other countries and that the blame can be placed mainly 
on events which were outside the control of the Japanese government. 
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With present day hindsight it is, of course, possible to say that had the 
government acted differently Japan may have suffered even less 9 but this 
could hardly be expected when considering the "state of the art" at that 
time. The decisive cause for the depression was the reduction in export 
prices brought about by the decline in foreign demand. Devaluation of the 
yen would be quite ineffective in increasing export quantities and would 
have had an inverse effect on import prices. The quantity of money was 
not wholly determined by the amount of gold and could be increased even 
while the gold stock went down. Speculation, while exerting a negative 
impact on aggregate demand, was not the decisive factor in lowering it. 
The previous discussion has been concerned with the depression 
itself, but we have also to consider some of its consequences. Much has 
been said about the depression as a major factor in strengthening the 
military faction who led Japan on the way to war. However unfortunate 
this turn of events, it cannot negate some positive economic effects. 
The depression accelerated already existing trends in changing 
the structure of the economy, chief among them a reduction in the role 
played by the agricultural sector. We must also note that one of the aims 
of the government in its deflationary·policy(climaxed by the return to 
gold) was to create a mild recession which would cause firms and consumers 
to'rationalize" their behavior and increase efficiency. In this respect 
it was a repetition of the much acclaimed "Matsukata deflation" in the 
1880's, considered as a turning point in early Japanese industrialization. 
The coincidence of the world depression with this deflationary policy tilted 
the economy too far but at the same time did result in a higher level of 




recovery from the depression and the large increase in exports since 1931. 
It is to be lamented that much of this new potential was directed to war 
-efforts rather than to improve the welfare of the Japanese people. 
-21-
Footnotes 
1It is therefore not surprising to find books about the depression 
in other countries where Japan is referred to as virtually the only country 
to emerge unscathed from the depression. See Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-war 
Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 (New York, 1970) p. 41 and W. Arthur Lewis, 
Economic Survey 1919-1939 (London, 1949), p.61. 
2The index for Japan given in Table 2, the Yasuba index, shows a 
reduction in industrial production between 1929 and 1931. Two other 
indices of manufacturing production (which exclude public utilities and 
mining) show an increase in the same period, 6% according to Shionoya 
and 2. 3% according to Shinohara. See Yuichi Shionoya, "Nihon no Kogyo 
Seisan Shisu 1874-1940" (Japan's Index of Manufacturing Production 1874-
1940) in Miyohei Shinohara, Sangyo Kozoron (Industrial Structure) Tokyo, 
1966), Appendix, pp.1-27 and Miyohei Shinohara, Estimates of Long-Term 
Economic Statistics of Japan Since 1868, Vol. 10 (Tokyo, 1972), -p.147. 
3Kuzuo Sato, "Daifukyoki no Nihon Keizai" (The Japanese Economy 
in the Great Depression), Keizai Kenkyu 27 (January 1976), p.5. 
4nepartment of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions of Japan to 
30th June 1930, (London, 1930), p. 15. 
5Kazushi Ohkawa, The Growth Rate of the Japanese Economy Since 
1878, (Tokyo, 11157), p.. 145. 
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6Sansom, at that time the commercial councillor at the British 
Embassy in Tokyo, observed that at the end of 1931 the dimensions of 
unemployment, though disquiet'ing, were not so severe as to constitute 
a serious social problem. 
7Sato, "Daifukyoki", p. 5. 
8
As we shall see later the main effect of the depression in 
Japan was on export prices, not volume. 
9W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey 1919-1939, (London, 1949), p.118. 
lOThus in 1929 30% of all employees in manufacturing were in firms 
with 4 workers or less. Calculated from Shinohara, Estimates of Long-Term 
Economic Statistics, Vol. 10·, pp. 248-257. 
11sansom mentioned in his report that "Most industrial and commercial 
undertakings in Japan had managed to make some profits in 1931, and some 
even placed funds to reserve", Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Condi­
tions to December 31, 1932, p.11. 
12 11 - The price of rice rose slightly at theSato, Daifukyoki", p. 6. 
end of 1931 when Northern Japan was hit by bad crop. See Yamamura, "Then 
Came the Great Depression", p. 200. 
13Mataji Umemura et. al., Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics 
of Japan Since 1868, Vol. 9 (Toky~- 1966), pp. 160-1. 
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14The following passage from Sansom's report is of interest: 
"There is good reason to believe that the press accounts of suffering 
among farmers were often more sensational than exact, and that there were 
motives of party politics behind the agitation which brought the problem 
to the foreground. The truth is that agrarian distress is in some 
measure endemic inJapan partly because some rice-growing regions are poor 
in soil and climate, partly because of the difficulty of reconciling an 
agricultural and an industrial economy". Department of Overseas Trade, 
Economic Conditions to December 31, 1932, p. 14. 
15calculated from Umemura, Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics, 
Vol. 9, p. 221. 
16Manabu Takita, "Japan's Gold Embargo Lifted and Reimposed", Oita 
Commercial College, Research Department Bulletin No. 3 (December 1932), p.27. 
17Yukio Cho, Showa Kyoko, (Tokyo, 1973), p. 95. (The Showa Panic) 
18
Cho describes it as a dumping-type policy, Showa Kyoko, p. 118. 
19
How can we reconcile our contention that devaluation would not have had 
a considerable effect with the large increase in exports after the devaluation 
of December 1931. First we have to remember that this devaluation was very 
considerable, 50% in one year, while a devaluation in January 1930 would 
-have been around 10%. Secondly, a major change in composition as well as 
geographical distribution of Japanese exports todcplace: between 1929 and 
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1932 the share of export to the U.S. declined from 44 to 19 per cent and 
the share of textiles went down from 67 to 53 per 'Cent. Moreover, increased 
-efficiency due to the depression may well have played a role. 
20M. Friedman and .Anna T. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the 
United States 1867-1960, (New York, 1963), p. 361. Likewide the stock 
of gold in France almost doubled between the end of 1929 and August 1931. 
See Gustav Cassell, The Downfall of the Gold Standard, (London, 1966), 
p. 60. 
21Junnosuke Inouye, Problems of the Japanese Exchange, 1914-1926, 
(Glasgow, 1931), Ch. 4. 
22Takita "Japan's Gold Embargo", p. 26. Takita claims that the 
government was not well prepared for the policy change: a part of specie 
holdings was bought from the yokohama Specie Bank and was needed to cover 
the deficit in the trade balance, and the terms of foreign credit were 
very unfavorable. 
23Takita ibid. p. 29. 
24other measures were also taken to stop the purchase of specie for 
speculative purposes. On October 14, 1931, the Yokohama Specie Bank 
_declared that it will not sell specie except for real needs of foreign 
trade, and from November l_.of the same year it refused to sell specie for 
"speculative imports". Moral persuasion was also attempted by the Bank 




william W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton, 
1954) p. 521. Incidentally, this depression also preceded the adoption of 
the gold standard in 1897. 
2~ukai concludes that: "the great strides made by our export trade are 
fundamentally due to the fact that the productive capacity of the nation 
was improved during the period of depression, making available a supply of 
goods at low .. cost" (''Monetary Policy" p. 393). Sansom writes: "That 
rationalization has been more than a popular phase is patent to anyone who 
has spent the last few years in Japan. The quality and the variety of 
Japanese manufacturers have improved at a remarkable rate. The development 
was doubtless not so sudden as it appears .•• But the hard time of 1930 seems 
to have accelerated the progress, with the result that today in many 
fields the Japanese manufacturer produces a better article than ever, and 
at less cost" (Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Japan 
To December 31, 1973, p. 28). 
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Table 1: Rate of Growth - International Comparison
{percentage change relative to previous year - constant prices) 
Japan u.s. U.K. France Germany Sweden
(GNP) (GNP) (NNI) (NI) (NI) (NI) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1929 1.1 6.0 4.8 9.9 o.o 7.8 
1930 0.9 -8.9 3.8 -0.9 -3.8 2.7 
1931 1.2 -5.9 -2.8 -4.5 -11.8 -5.3 
1932 4.0 -14.6 -1.6 -6.7 -11.1 -5.6 
1933 9.5 -2.9 5.4 o.o 0.5 2.0 
Source: 
Column (1) Kazuo Sato, "Daifukyaki no Nihon Keizai" (The Japanese Economy 
in the Great Depression), Keizai Kenkyu, 27, (January, 1976), p. 5. 
Column (2) Calculated from Peter Temin, Did Monetary Forces Cause the 
Great Depression, (N. Y., 1976), p. 4. 
Column (3) Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-war Economy: Britain, 1919-1939, 
(N. Y., 1970), pp. 32-33. 
Columns (4) - (6) Calculated from Ingvar Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation 
in the European Economy, (Geneva, 1954), p. 233. 
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Table 2: Index of Industrial Production (1929 • 100) 
Japan u. s. U.K. France Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 166.0 
1930 96.9 80.7 92.3 99.1 85.9 
1931 93.9 68.1 83.8 86.2 67.6 
1932 102.5 53.8 83.5 71.6 53.3 
1933 116.9 63.9 88.2 80. 7 60.7 
1934 132.4 66.4 98.8 75.2 79.8 
1935 149. 3 75.6 165.6 72 .5 94.0 
Source: 
Column (1) Calculated from Yasukichi Yasuba, "A Revised Index of Indus­
trial Production for Japan, 1905-1935", Osaka Economic Papers 19 
(March 1971), p. 32. 
Column (2) - (5) Bank of Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese 
Economy, (Tokyo, 1966), p. 397. 
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Table 3: Unemployment Ratea (%) 
Japan u.s. U.K. Germany 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1929 NA 12 8.2 NA 
1930 5.3 11.821 NA 
1931 6.1 26 16.7 23.7 
1932 6.8 32' 17 .6 30.1 
1933 5.6 31 16.4 25.8 
1934 5.0 26 13.9 14.5 
1935 4.6 23 13.2 11.6 
8unemployment figures are based on different estimates as follows: 
Column (1) official estimates 
(2) trade union returns 
(3) compulsory unemployment insurance statistics 
(4) employment exchange statistics 
Source: League of Nations Statistical Year Book 1935/36, 
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Table 4: Total volume of exports (Index, 1929 m 100) 
Japan U.K. Germany France .Europe World 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1930 97 81 94 90 90 94 
1931 100 62 86 77 77 85 
1932 123 63 60 59 62 74 
1933 133 64 55 60 62 74 
Source: 
Column (1) c•lculated from Takafusa Nakamura, Senzenki Nihon Keizai Seicho 
no Bunseki (An Analysis of Japan's Economic Growth in the Prewar Period), 
(Tokyo, 1971), p. 212. 
columns (2) - (4) Calculated from Svennilson, Growth and Stagaation 1 p. 314. 
columns (5) - (6) Calculated from ibid., p. 292. 
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Table 5: Wholesale prices, 1929 • 100 
Japan u.s. U.K. Germany France Sweden 
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1930 81.9 83.7 85.2 90.7 86.4 88.9 
1931 69.6 63.1 71.1 78.3 73.4 75.4 
1932 77.2 52.5 68.9 67.4 64.6 72.2 
1933 88.5 58.2 68.1 65.9 62.2 71.4 
Source 
Column (1) Calculated from Kozo Yamamura, "Then Came the Great Depression, 
Japan's Interwar Years" in Herman van der Wee (ed.), The Great Depression 
Revisited, (The Hague~ 1972), p. 209. 
Column (2) - (6) Calculated from Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation, p. 234. 











Table 6: Prices received by farmers and prices of current 
inputs paid by farmers (index, 1934-36 c 100) 
Prices received Prices paid 
by farmers by farmers 
(1) (2) (3) = (1) ¼ (2) 
114.3 123.17 92.8 
75.3 93.20 79.4 
69.3 70.92 97.7 
77 .8 82.92 93.8 
85.6 88.00 97.3 
(1) Umemura, Estimates of Long-term Economic Statistics, Vol. 9, 
(2) ibid. p. 191. 
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Table 7: Balance of Payments, Japan Proper, Net Balance 
(mil Ii on yen) 
Merchandise Current Monetary Long-time Short-term 
Trade Account Gold Capital Capital (a) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
I 929 -160.5 88.4 -2.6 -1 64. 6 78.8 
I 930 -134.3 43.3 274.5 -303. 7 -14.1 
I 931 -206.6 -81.5 370.8 -372.0 82.7 
I 932 -134.2 41.8 102.8 -258.0 113.4 
I 933 -113.0 43.2 7.7 -215.3 164.4 
(a) including errors and omissions 
Source 
Kazushi Ohkawa et. al., Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of 
Japan Since 1868, Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1974), P· 193. 
-33-
Table 8: Amounts of Bank Notes Issued and Reserves, 
the Bank of Japan, (million yen) 
Special Security Bank Notes Excess of 
Reserves Reserves Issued Issue 
(I) (2) (3) (4)a 
I 929 1,072 570 1,642 450 
1930 826 610 1,436 490 
l 931 470 861 1,331 741 
1932 425 1,001 1,426 l 
I 933 425 1,120 1,545 120 
8 1929-31 (4) = (3) - (1) - 120, 1931-32 (4) = (3) - (I) - 1000 
Source 
Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Annual Statistical Report 1933 
(Tokyo, 1934), p. 185. 
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includes government notes, Bank of Japan notes (excluding reserve 
against notes issued by other banks), Yokohama Specie Bank silver 
notes and subsidiary coins. 
Total private deposits minus time deposits. 
Source 
Column (1) Bank of Japan, Hundred Year Statistics, p. 167 
Column (2) ibid., p. 201. 
